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Adaptationism – how to carry out an exaptationist program

Andrews, Paul W., Gangestad, Steven W. and Matthews, Dan (2002) Adaptationism – how to carry out an exaptationist program.

Short Abstract:

Adaptationism is a research strategy that seeks to identify adaptations and the specific selective forces that drove their evolution in past environments. Adaptationism, especially as applied towards understanding human behavior and cognition, has been the subject of attacks by paleontologist Stephen J. Gould and geneticist Richard Lewontin. Primarily, they argue that adaptationists often use lax standards of evidence to identify adaptations and that they often fail to consider alternative hypotheses to adaptation. In this article we discuss the possible standards of evidence that could be used to identify adaptations and when and how they may be appropriately used. We also discuss how the testing of alternative hypotheses implicitly requires the testing of adaptationist hypotheses. Where possible, we illustrate our points with examples taken from human behavior and cognition.

Long Abstract:

Adaptationism is a research strategy that seeks to identify adaptations and the specific selective forces that drove their evolution in past environments. Since the mid-1970’s, paleontologist Stephen J. Gould and geneticist Richard Lewontin have been critical of adaptationism, especially as applied towards understanding human behavior and cognition. Perhaps the most prominent criticism they made was that adaptationist explanations were analogous to Rudyard Kipling’s "just-so" stories. Since story telling (through the generation of hypotheses and the making of inferences) is an inherent part of science, the criticism refers to the acceptance of stories without sufficient empirical evidence. In particular, Gould, Lewontin, and their colleagues argue that adaptationists often use inappropriate evidentiary standards for identifying adaptations and their functions and that they often fail to consider alternative hypotheses to adaptation. Playing prominently in both of these attacks are the concepts of constraint, spandrel, and exaptation. In this article we discuss the standards of evidence that could be used to identify adaptations and when and how they may be appropriately used. Moreover, building an empirical case that certain features of a trait are best explained by exaptation, spandrel, or constraint requires demonstrating that the trait’s features cannot be better accounted for by adaptationist hypotheses. Thus, we argue that the testing of alternatives requires the consideration, testing, and systematic rejection of adaptationist hypotheses. Where possible, we illustrate our points with examples taken from human behavior and cognition.