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The self-organizing consciousness

Perruchet, Pierre and Vinter, Annie (2002) The self-organizing consciousness.

Short Abstract:

We propose that the isomorphism generally observed between the representations composing our momentary phenomenal experience and the structure of the world is the end-product of a progressive organization that emerges thanks to elementary associative processes that take our conscious representations themselves as the stuff on which they operate, a thesis that we summarize in the concept of Self-Organizing Consciousness (SOC). We show that the SOC framework accounts for the discovery of words and objects, and for word-object mapping. We then argue that isomorphic representations may underlie seemingly rule-governed behavior, as is observed in the areas of implicit learning of arbitrary structures, language, problem solving, and automatisms. This analysis provides support for the so-called "mentalistic" framework (e.g. Dulany, 1997), which avoids postulating the existence of unconscious representations and computations.

Long Abstract:

The conventional cognitive framework rests on the existence of a powerful cognitive unconscious. Indeed, most psychological models heavily rely on the possibility of performing manipulations and transformations of unconscious representations using algorithms that are unable to operate while accommodating the functional constraints of conscious thought.

This paper explores the viability of an alternative framework which has its origins in the work of Dulany (1991, 1997). In this alternative, "mentalistic" framework, to borrow Dulany's terminology, the only representations people create and manipulate are those which form the momentary phenomenal experience. The main challenge is to explain why the phenomenal experience of adult people consists of perceptions and representations of the world which are generally isomorphic with the world structure, without needing recourse to a powerful cognitive unconscious. Our proposal is that this isomorphism is the end-product of a progressive organization that emerges thanks to elementary associative processes that take the conscious representations themselves as the stuff on which they operate. We summarize this thesis in the concept of Self-Organizing Consciousness (SOC).

We first provide evidence of self-organization in the context of an experimental example which concerns the progressive extraction of words from an artificial language presented as an unsegmented speech flow (e.g.: Saffran et al., 1997). Our approach is supported by a computer-implemented model, PARSER, the details of which are presented elsewhere (Perruchet & Vinter, 1998 b). A remarkable feature of PARSER is that the only representations generated by the model closely match the conscious representations people may have when performing the task. We then show that, provided that we accept a few simple assumptions about the properties of the world that are likely to capture subjects' attention, the rationale underlying PARSER may be extended to the discovery of the relevant units which form natural language and the physical world, and also accounts for word-object mapping.

We then apply the same principles to more complex aspects of the world structure. We show how the SOC framework can account for some forms of behavior seemingly based on the unconscious knowledge of the syntactical structure of the surrounding environment. This demonstration, which was originally stimulated by the literature on implicit learning of arbitrary structures, finds some echoes in the literature on language processing (notably in the so-called distributional approaches, e.g. Redington, Chater, & Finch, 1998), problem solving (for instance in the computation/ representation trade-off proposed by Clark & Thornton, 1997), incubation (e.g. Mandler, 1994), decision making, and automatism (notably in the instance-based models, as proposed by Logan, e.g.:1988, and Tzelgov, e.g.: 1997). We also show how the SOC framework, in conjunction with simple additional hypotheses, readily accounts for transfer between event patterns across sensory content, as shown for instance in the Marcus et al. (1999) study.

Finally, we argue against the empirical reliability of a some additional phenomena that seemingly require the action of the cognitive unconscious. In this context, we critically examine the studies reporting that implicit memory and implicit learning can occur without any attentional processing of the material during the familiarization phase (e.g. Eich, 1984; Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990), and the data allegedly demonstrating the possibility of unconscious processing of semantic information (e.g. Dehaene et al., 1998). Issues related to the apparent dissociation between performance and consciousness in neuropsychological syndromes, such as blindsight, are also briefly discussed. Our analysis leads to the surprising conclusion that there is no need for the concepts of unconscious representations and knowledge and, a fortiori, the notion of unconscious inferences: Conscious mental life, when considered within a dynamic perspective, could be sufficient to account for adapted behavior. This alternative framework is more parsimonious than the prevalent conceptions in cognitive and developmental sciences because it manages to account for very sophisticated behavior while respecting the important constraints inherent to the conscious/attentional system, such as limited capacity, seriality of processing, and quick forgetting (and even takes advantage of these constraints).