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Common misunderstandings of memes (and genes)

Gil-White, Francisco J. Common misunderstandings of memes (and genes).

Short Abstract:

Short Abstract: ‘Memetics’ suffers from conceptual confusion and not enough empirical work. This paper attempts to attenuate the former problem by resolving the conceptual controversies. I criticize the overly literal insistence—by both critics and advocates—on the genetic analogy, which asks us to think about memes as bona-fide replicators in the manner of genes, and to see all cultural transmission processes as ultimately for the reproductive benefit of memes, rather than their human vehicles. A Darwinian approach to cultural transmission, I argue, requires neither. It is possible to have Darwinian processes without genes, or even close analogues of them. The cognitive mechanisms responsible for social-learning make clear why.

Long Abstract:

Long Abstract: ‘Memetics’ suffers from conceptual confusion and not enough empirical work. This paper attempts to attenuate the former problem by resolving the conceptual controversies, which requires that we not speculate about cultural transmission without being informed about the cognitive mechanisms responsible for social learning. I criticize the overly literal insistence—by both critics and advocates—on the genetic analogy, which asks us to think about memes as bona-fide replicators in the manner of genes, and to see all cultural transmission processes as ultimately for the reproductive benefit of memes, rather than their human vehicles. A Darwinian approach to cultural transmission, I argue, requires neither. It is possible to have Darwinian processes without genes, or even close analogues of them. The insistence on a close genetic analogy is in fact based on a poor understanding of genes and evolutionary genetics, and of the kinds of simplifications that are legitimate in evolutionary models. Some authors have insisted that the only admissible definition for a ‘meme’ is ‘selfish replicator.’ However, since the only agreement as to the definition of ‘meme’ is that it is what gets passed on through non-genetic means, only conceptual confusion can result from trying to make a hypothesis into a definition. This paper will argue that, although memes are not, in fact, ‘selfish replicators,’ they can and should be analyzed with Darwinian models. It will argue further that the ‘selfish meme’ theoretical calque imported from genetics does much more to distort than enlighten our understanding of cultural processes.

Keywords:	Cultural transmission, culture, evolutionary genetics, meme, memetics, replicator, social-learning.
Subjects:	Biology: Evolution Biology: Population Biology Psychology: Cognitive Psychology Psychology: Evolutionary Psychology Philosophy: Philosophy of Science Psychology: Social Psychology
ID code:	bbs00001244
Deposited by:	Francisco Gil-White on 19 May 2002
Alternative Locations:	http://www.psych.upenn.edu/~fjgil/Memes2.htm