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Is Vision Continuous With Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception


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Pylyshyn, Zenon Is Vision Continuous With Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception.

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Short Abstract:

Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities in determining the function it computes - in other words, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early vision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this claim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related potentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of vision.

Long Abstract:

Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities in determining the function it computes - in other words, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early vision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this claim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related potentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of vision.

Keywords:visual processing, modularity, cognitive penatrability, early vision, context effects, top down processes, signal detection theory, attention, expert perception, perceptual learning, knowledge-based vision, visual agnosia, categorical perception.
Subjects:Psychology: Perceptual Cognitive Psychology
Psychology: Psychophysics
ID code:bbs00000494
Deposited by:Zenon Pylyshyn on 01 May 2001



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