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A Theory of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge

Dienes, Zoltan and Perner, Josef (1999) A Theory of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge.

Short Abstract:

The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. Number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly; this parital hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. The most important type of implicit knowledge consists of representations that merely reflect the property of objects or events without predicating them to any particular entity or event. The clearest case of explicit knowledge of a fact are reflective representations of one's own attitude of knowing that fact. These distinctions are discussed in their relationship to similar distinctions like procedural-declarative, conscious-unconscious, verbalizable-nonverbalizable, direct-indirect tests, and automatic-voluntary control. This is followed by an outline of how these distinctions can be used to integrate and relate the often divergent uses of the implicit-explicit distinction in different research areas. We illustrate this for visual perception, memory, cognitive development, and artificial grammar learning.

Long Abstract:

The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. Number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly; this parital hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. The most important type of implicit knowledge consists of representations that merely reflect the property of objects or events without predicating them to any particular entity or event. The clearest case of explicit knowledge of a fact are reflective representations of one's own attitude of knowing that fact. These distinctions are discussed in their relationship to similar distinctions like procedural-declarative, conscious-unconscious, verbalizable-nonverbalizable, direct-indirect tests, and automatic-voluntary control. This is followed by an outline of how these distinctions can be used to integrate and relate the often divergent uses of the implicit-explicit distinction in different research areas. We illustrate this for visual perception, memory, cognitive development, and artificial grammar learning.

Keywords:	Implicit knowledge, consciousness, automaticity, memory, cognitive development, visual perception, artificial grammar learning
Subjects:	Psychology: Behavioral Analysis Psychology: Consciousness Studies Psychology: Developmental Psychology Psychology: Learning and Memory Psychology: Perceptual Cognitive Psychology Philosophy: Decision Theory Philosophy: Epistemology Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind
ID code:	bbs00000457
Deposited by:	Zoltan Dienes on 01 May 2001