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INTENTIONAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING

Barresi , John and Moore, Chris (1996) INTENTIONAL RELATIONS AND SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING.

Short Abstract:

Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities can be called "intentional relations." We present a four-level framework for social understanding which organizes the ways in which social organisms represent their own intentional relations those of other agents. The information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents' intentional relations (or third person information). We propose that with the development of the imagination, children progress through three stages, equivalent to the later three levels of the framework. The abnormalities in social understanding of autistic individuals may result from a failure to develop integrated representations of intentional relations.

Long Abstract:

Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities cab be called "intentional relations." We present a four-level framework for social understanding which organizes the ways in which social organisms represent their own intentional relations those of other agents. The information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents' intentional relations (or third person information). Through the integration of these two sources of information, it is possible to generate representations of intentional relations that are uniformly applicable to the activities of both self and other. The four levels of the framework differ in the extent to which such integration occurs and in the degree to which imagination is involved in generating these representations. Most animals are at the lowest level, at which integration of first and third person sources of information does not occur. Among nonhuman species, only great apes exhibit social understanding at intermediate levels, at which integration of these sources of information provides uniform representations of intentional relations. Only humans attain the highest level, at which it is possible to represent intentional relations to mental objects. We propose that with the development of the imagination, children progress through three stages, equivalent to the later three levels of the framework. The abnormalities in social understanding of autistic individuals may result from a failure to develop integrated representations of intentional relations.

Keywords:	animal cognition; autism; development; evolution; imitation; intentionality; joint attention; representations; social understanding; theory of mind
Subjects:	Psychology: Applied Cognitive Psychology Biology: Animal Behavior Biology: Animal Cognition Biology: Evolution Psychology: Cognitive Psychology Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind Psychology: Social Psychology
ID code:	bbs00000428
Deposited by:	John Barresi on 01 May 2001