Table 3
Examples of findings from studies
that used indirect measures of musically-induced emotions
___________________________________________________________________________
Measure Description Study
___________________________________________________________________________
Psycho-motor
Writing speed Shorter
time for writing down Pignatiello
et al. (1986)
numbers
from 100 to 1
Count
time Shorter time to count from 1 to 10 Clark & Teasdale (1985)
Distance approximation Smaller distances estimated Kenealy (1988)
Motivational
Incentives Higher ratings of willingness to Wood
et al. (1990)
participate in social activities
Information-processing
Word
association Shorter time to produce Kenealy (1988)
associations to words
Coding
speed Shorter time to complete a Wood et al. (1990)
symbol-coding procedure
Decision time Shorter time to decision Kenealy
(1988)
Judgmental/Behavioral
Subjective Probability Higher estimates of probability Teasdale & Spencer (1984)
success and lower estimates of
failure
Evaluative judgments More positive evaluations of ads Gorn et al. (2001)
Purchase intentions Lower in-store purchase intentions Bruner (1990)
Sexual
arousal Stronger sexual arousal Mitchell et al. (1998)
Physical attraction Higher ratings of attraction May & Hamilton (1980)
Emotion perception More happiness and less sadness Bouhuys et al. (1995)
perceived in facial expressions
___________________________________________________________________________
Note. Description refers to effects of positive (happy) as compared to
negative (sad) emotions.
episodic memory). When the melody was augmented
by a predictable harmonic sequence, he started to fantasize about the music,
conjuring up visual images – like a beautiful landscape –that were shaped by
the music’s flowing character (i.e., visual imagery). Next, the musical
structure began to build up towards what he expected to be a resolution of the
tension of the previous notes when suddenly the harmonics changed unexpectedly
to another key, causing his breathing to come to a brief halt (i.e., musical expectancy).
He thought, ‘This piece of music is really a cleverly constructed piece! It
actually made me reach my goal to forget my trouble at work.’ Reaching this
goal made him happy (i.e., cognitive appraisal).”
This fictitious,
although empirically inspired (Juslin et al. 2006), example gives an idea of
the phenomena that need to be explained by a satisfactory model of musical
emotions. One thing should be apparent from this brief example: there is no single mechanism that can account for all instances of musically-induced
emotion. Yet, although several authors have acknowledged that there may be more
than one mechanism (e.g., Berlyne, 1971; Dowling & Harwood, 1986; Meyer,
1956; Scherer & Zentner, 2001; Sloboda & Juslin, 2001), there has been
no attempt to develop a complete theoretical framework with a set of
hypotheses. In fact, few of the theories proposed have even been properly
tested.
In the following sections,
we outline a new theoretical framework featuring six psychological mechanisms
that we hypothesize are involved in the musical induction of emotions: (1) Brain stem reflexes; (2) Evaluative conditioning; (3) Emotional contagion; (4) Visual imagery; (5) Episodic memory;
and (6) Musical expectancy. We
suggest that these mechanisms (along with cognitive appraisal) can explain most
emotions induced by music in everyday life.[6] It
must be noted at the outset that, though we consider it necessary to
distinguish among the mechanisms for research purposes (Section 3.2), the
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they should be regarded as
complementary ways through which music might induce emotions. Our framework
builds partly on the work of pioneers in the field (Berlyne, 1971; Meyer,
1956), as well as on more recent ideas (Juslin & Sloboda, 2001). However,
by synthesizing theories and findings from several domains, we are able to
provide the first set of hypotheses that may help researchers to distinguish
between the mechanisms. Below, we first describe each mechanism separately and
then present the hypotheses. Because few studies so far have investigated these
mechanisms in regard to music, the description of each mechanism is broad and
preliminary.
3.1. Psychological
mechanisms
3.1.1. Brain stem
reflex
Brain stem reflex refers
to a process whereby an emotion is induced by music because one or more
fundamental acoustical characteristics of the music are taken by the brain stem
to signal a potentially important and urgent event. All other things being
equal, sounds that are sudden, loud, dissonant, or feature fast temporal
patterns induce arousal or feelings of unpleasantness in listeners (e.g.,
Berlyne, 1971; Burt et al., 1995; Foss et al.,
1989; Halpern et al., 1986). Such
responses reflect the impact of auditory sensations – music as sound in the most basic sense.
The perceptual system is
constantly scanning the immediate environment in order to discover potentially
important changes or events. Certain sound qualities are indicative of change,
such as sudden or extreme sounds, sounds that change very quickly, or sounds
that are the result of strong force or large size. Sounds that meet certain
criteria (e.g., fast, loud, noisy, very low- or high-frequenced) will therefore
produce an increased activation of the central nervous system. The precise
physiological processes underlying such brain stem responses are not completely
understood, although evidence suggests that they occur in close connection with
the reticular formation of the brain stem and the intralaminar nuclei of the
thalamus, which receive inputs from the auditory system. The brainstem is an
ancient structure of the brain that sub-serves a number of sensory and motor
functions including, but not limited to, auditory perception and the mediation
and control of attention, emotional arousal, heart rate, breathing, and
movement (Joseph, 2000). The reticular system is in a position to quickly
induce arousal so that attention may be selectively directed at sensory stimuli
of potential importance. The system exerts its widespread influences on sensory
and motor functions and arousal through neurotransmitters such as
norepinephrine and serotonin. While the system may be activated and inhibited
by the amygdala, hypothalamus, and orbitofrontal cortex, it may also be
activated independently of these structures in a more reflex-like manner
(Lipscomb & Hodges, 1996; Tranel, 2000).
Brain stem reflexes to
music rely on the early stages of auditory processing. When an auditory signal
reaches the primary auditory cortex, it has already undergone a number of
analyses by such brain structures as the superior olivary complex, the inferior
colliculus, and the thalamus (Koelsch & Siebel, 2005). Accordingly, alarm
signals to auditory events that suggest ‘danger’ may be emitted as early as at
the level of the inferior colliculus and the thalamus. Brain stem reflexes are
‘hard-wired’. Thus, for instance, the perceived pleasantness and unpleasantness
of sensory consonance and dissonance reflects how the hearing system divides
frequencies into critical bandwidths: if the frequency separation of two tones
is either very small or larger than the critical bandwidth, the tones will be
judged as consonant. If the separation is about 1/4 of a critical band, the
tones will be judged as maximally dissonant (Lipscomb & Hodges, 1996).
Sensory dissonance is suggestive of ‘danger’ in natural environments, because
it occurs in the ‘threat’ and ‘warning’ calls of many species of animals
(Jürgens, 1992). Dissonance may thus have been selected by evolution as an
unlearned negative reinforcer of behavior (Rolls, 2007).
Brain stem reflexes are
quick and automatic, as shown by evidence of rapid and pre-attentive
categorization of subtle timbral differences associated with different emotions
(Goydke et al., 2004), and affective priming effects of consonant and dissonant
chords (Sollberger, Reber, & Eckstein, 2003). Brain stem responses to music
may function even prior to birth, as indicated by findings that playing loud
music to fetuses produces heart rate accelerations and increased motor
responses, whereas soft music produces moderate heart rate decelerations and
reduced movement (for a review, see Lecanuet, 1996).
The arousal-inducing
properties of music were investigated and theorized by Berlyne (1971).[7]
According to Berlyne’s theory, listeners will prefer musical stimuli that
induce an ‘optimum’ level of physiological arousal. If the ‘arousal potential’
of the music is too high, listeners will reject the music. Similarly, if the
‘arousal potential’ is too low, listeners will reject the music. Hence, Berlyne
hypothesized that listeners’ preferences are related to arousal (or some aspect
of it, such as speed or loudness) in the form of an inverted U-shaped curve
(the Wundt curve). Berlyne’s (1971) theory has received some empirical support
from experimental studies (for a review, see North & Hargreaves, 1997). In
addition, several studies have shown that listeners use music to regulate their
arousal in order to obtain ‘optimal’ arousal
(DeNora, 2001; Thayer, 1996). However,
what is judged as ‘optimal’ by the listener varies depending on the situation
(North & Hargreaves, 1997) and on personality characteristics of the
listener (McNamara & Ballard, 1999). Thus, it may be difficult to predict
arousal responses without taking individual and contextual factors into
consideration. Brain stem reflexes can explain the stimulating and relaxing
effects of music, and how mere sounds may induce pleasantness and
unpleasantness. However, it is unclear how the mechanism could explain the
induction of discrete emotions.
3.1.2. Evaluative conditioning
Evaluative
conditioning (EC) refers to a process whereby an emotion is induced by a piece
of music simply because this stimulus has been paired repeatedly with other
positive or negative stimuli. Thus, for instance, a particular piece of music
may have occurred repeatedly together in time with a specific event that always
made you very happy (e.g., meeting your best friend).
Over time, through repeated pairings, the music will eventually come to evoke
happiness even in the absence of the friendly interaction.
Evaluative
conditioning is also referred to as affective
learning, fear conditioning, emotional conditioning, and preference conditioning, but regardless
of the term used, it seems to refer to the same phenomenon – a form of classic
conditioning that involves the pairing of an initially neutral conditioned
stimulus (CS) with an affectively valenced, unconditioned stimulus (US). After
the pairing, the CS acquires the ability to evoke the same affective state as
the US in the perceiver. Regardless of the term used, and of whether positive
(e.g., liking) or negative (e.g., fear) states are conditioned, the process
appears to have the same characteristics.
Firstly,
EC may occur even if the participant is unaware of the contingency of the two
stimuli (Field & Moore, 2005; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005), which may not
be true for other forms of classic conditioning (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks,
2002). Indeed, it has been reported that an EC response can be both established
and induce emotions without awareness (Martin et al., 1984; Öhman & Mineka,
2001). Attention may even hamper effects of EC (De Houwer et al., 2005). This
characteristic of EC has some interesting implications for music experiences:
it has been found that, quite often, pieces of music induce emotions for no
apparent reason (e.g., Juslin et al., 2006). EC offers a possible explanation
of this phenomenon. Furthermore, it generates the prediction that we might
react with positive emotions to music that we think is of poor quality simply
because the music has occurred repeatedly in previous pleasant situations. Such
effects could presumably be demonstrated in listening experiments that use
established paradigms for conditioning (Lavond
& Steinmetz, 2003), along with indirect measures of emotion (Table 3). Secondly, EC seems to be more resistant to
extinction than other forms of classic conditioning (LeDoux, 2002). (Extinction refers to the process whereby
postacquisition presentations of the conditioned stimulus, e.g., a specific
piece of music, without the unconditioned stimulus, e.g., a happy event, leads
to a gradual elimination of the previously acquired response; De Houwer et al.,
2001, p. 858). Hence, once a piece of
music has been strongly associated with a specific emotional outcome, this
association could be quite persistent. Thirdly, EC seems to depend on
unconscious, unintentional, and effortless processes (De Houwer et al., 2005;
LeDoux, 2002), which involve sub-cortical brain regions such as the amygdala
and the cerebellum (Balleine & Killcross, 2006; Johnsrude et al., 2000;
Sacchetti et al., 2005).
While
this mechanism seems to be generally acknowledged as a powerful source of
emotions in music (see Berlyne, 1971, p. 33; Dowling & Harwood, 1986, pp.
204-205; Hanslick, 1986; Sloboda & Juslin, 2001, pp. 94-95), very few
studies so far have investigated EC responses to music. There are two possible
reasons for this. Firstly, the responses are often highly personal and idiosyncratic
(i.e., different listeners have different learning histories, with a few
notable exceptions), which may seem to render them more difficult to study
systematically. Secondly, because EC responses are not strongly related to the
music as such – the music merely acts as a conditioned stimulus – they have
been regarded as ‘irrelevant’ responses to music and, thus, unworthy of study
(Hanslick, 1986). However, if EC is a strong and frequent source of
music-induced emotions in everyday life, the mechanism should be part of a
credible framework for musical emotions. Which element of the musical stimulus
that best serves as the conditioned stimulus as well as its degree of
generalization and discrimination are issues that remain to be investigated.
The melody (or theme) of the music could be especially effective, though
studies of fear conditioning have shown that even a simple tone can be
effective in establishing a fear association (LeDoux, 2002).
Blair
and Shimp (1992) reported that when participants were originally exposed to a
piece of music in an unpleasant situation, they later held a less favorable
affective attitude towards a product presented together with the music than
participants who had not been pre-exposed to same conditioning. Similarly, Razran
(1954) found, in a series of experiments, that affective attitudes (as indexed
by ratings and characterizations) towards pieces of music, paintings, and
photographs could be modified by free lunches – at least when participants were
unaware of the aim to condition them. It should be noted that music commonly
occurs in situations where music listening is not the only or the primary
activity (see Juslin & Laukka, 2004; Sloboda & O’Neill, 2001) and where
subtle conditioning processes outside awareness could easily occur. Thus, it
seems plausible that EC could account for many of our emotional responses to
music in everyday life.[8]
3.1.3. Emotional
contagion
Emotional contagion refers
to a process whereby an emotion is induced by a piece of music because the
listener perceives the emotional expression of the music, and then ‘mimics’
this expression internally, which by means of either peripheral feedback from
muscles, or a more direct activation of the relevant emotional representations
in the brain, leads to an induction of the same emotion. For instance, the
music might have a sad expression (e.g., slow tempo, low pitch, low sound
level) that induces sadness in the listener (Juslin, 2001). Evidence that music
with a specific emotional expression can give rise to the same emotion in the
listener has been reported in several studies (e.g., Kallinen & Ravaja,
2006; Lundqvist et al., in press).
This mechanism is related
to the vast literature on emotional expression in music. It has been suggested
that expression may be an ‘iconic’ source of emotion (Dowling & Harwood,
1986). The term ‘iconic’ refers to the fact that the structures of music show
formal similarities to the structures of expressed (Kivy, 1980) or felt
(Langer, 1957) emotions. Numerous studies have shown that listeners are able to
perceive discrete emotions in pieces of music (Gabrielsson & Juslin, 2003),
and that even children as young as three or four years may be able to recognize
basic emotions in music (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988). But how exactly does
perception of an emotion in the music lead to induction of the same emotion in
the listener?
Lipps (1903) was probably
the first to postulate a mechanistic account of empathy, where the perception
of an emotional gesture in another person directly induces the same emotion in
the perceiver without any appraisal process (e.g., Preston
& de Waal, 2002). Modern research has confirmed that people may ‘catch’ the
emotions of others when seeing their facial expressions (Hatfield, Cacioppo,
& Rapson, 1994) or hearing their vocal expressions (Neumann & Strack,
2000). Previous research on emotional contagion has focused mostly on facial
expression. For example, people exposed to pictures of facial expressions of
emotions spontaneously activate the same face muscles (as shown by
electromyography) even when the pictures are processed outside of awareness.
Moreover, they report feeling the same emotions (Dimberg et al., 2000). It has
been argued that emotional contagion facilitates the mother-infant bond (Darwin, 1872), as well as social interaction in general (Preston & de Waal, 2002). In support, such contagion
seems to create affiliation and liking (e.g., Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, &
Chartrand, 2003), which is arguably beneficial for social interaction.
Recent research has
suggested that the process of emotional contagion may occur through the
mediation of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ discovered in studies of the monkey
pre-motor cortex in the 1990’s (e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 1992). It was found
that the mirror neurons discharged both when the monkey carried out an action
and when it observed another individual (monkey or human) carrying out a
similar action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). These mirror neurons
appeared to be located in the ventral pre-motor regions of the brain,
regardless of the type of stimulus. Direct evidence for the existence of mirror
neurons in humans is lacking so far, but there is a large amount of indirect
evidence suggesting that a mirror-neuron system exists also in humans. For example,
several studies have shown that when individuals observe an action carried out
by another individual, the motor cortex may become active in the absence of
overt motor activity (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). De Gelder et al.
(2004) reported that observing fear expressions in body language increased
activity in motor areas of the brain, in addition to those associated with
emotion, which is consistent with the notion of a mirror mechanism.
How may emotional contagion be applied to music? Because music often
features expressive acoustical patterns similar to those that occur in
emotional speech (for a review, see Juslin & Laukka, 2003), it has been
argued that we get aroused by the voice-like aspects of music via a process in
which a neural mechanism responds quickly and automatically to certain stimulus
features, which leads us to mimic the perceived emotion internally. According
to the ‘super-expressive voice’ theory (e.g., Juslin, 2001), what makes a
particular performance of music on, say, the violin, so expressive is the fact
that it sounds a lot like the human voice whereas at the same time it goes far beyond what the human voice can do in
terms of speed, intensity, and timbre. For example, if human speech is
perceived as ‘angry’ when it has fast rate, loud intensity, and a harsh timbre,
a musical instrument might sound extremely ‘angry’ in virtue of its even
higher speed, louder intensity, and harsher timbre. This aspect should render
music a particularly potent source of emotional contagion.
While the notion of
emotional contagion admittedly remains speculative in relation to music, a
recent fMRI study by Koelsch, Fritz, Cramon, Müller, and Friederici (2006)
indicated that music listening activated brain areas related to a circuitry
serving the formation of pre-motor representations for vocal sound production
(no singing was observed among the participants). Koelsch et al. concluded that
this could reflect a mirror-function mechanism, and the findings render
tentative support to the notion that listeners may mimic the emotional
expression of the music internally. Precursors of emotional contagion via
facial and vocal expression have been observed as early as the first year of
development (Soussignan & Schaal, 2005), but remain to be explored in relation
to music. We assume that emotional contagion mainly involves ‘basic’ emotions
with distinct nonverbal expressions (Juslin & Laukka, 2003; Laird &
Strout, 2007).
Some authors have pointed
out that music does not sound very much like vocal expressions, except in
special cases (Davies, 2001). Why, then, should we respond to music as if it
were a vocal expression? One possible explanation is that the expressions are
processed by a domain-specific and autonomous ‘module’ of the brain (Fodor,
1983), which reacts to certain features in the stimulus. This module does not
‘know’ the difference between a vocal expression and other acoustic
expressions, and will react in the same way (e.g., registering anger) as long
as certain cues (e.g., high speed, loud dynamics, rough timbre) are present in
the stimulus. This modular theory remains to be tested, but some support, in
terms of Fodor’s (1983) suggested characteristics of a module, was summarized
by Juslin and Laukka (2003, p. 803). Thus, it is plausible that listeners’
emotions to music sometimes reflect social, modular responses to the voice-like
and emotion-specific acoustic patterns of the music.[9]
3.1.4. Visual imagery
Visual imagery refers to
a process whereby an emotion is induced in a listener because he or she
conjures up visual images (e.g., of a beautiful landscape) while listening to
the music. The emotions experienced are the result of a close interaction
between the music and the images.[10]
Visual imagery is usually
defined as an experience that resembles perceptual experience, but that occurs
in the absence of relevant sensory stimuli. The study of visual imagery has an
old but confused status in psychology, marked by much controversy (Kolers,
1983). Much of the controversy has concerned its ontological status: Does
visual imagery involve a distinctively ‘pictorial’ representation of events in
mind, or does it reflect a ‘propositional’ representation? Kosslyn (1980)
argued that the images themselves are quasi-pictorial representations, whereas
the generative, long-term structure of imagery is propositional (e.g., similar
to a TV set whose output is a picture, but whose mechanisms for generating this
picture are better expressed in discrete symbols of electronics). The pictorial
view is supported by findings that many of the brain regions that are activated
during visual perception are similarly activated when a person is involved in
visual imagery (Farah, 2000; Ganis et al., 2004). In accordance with theories
of symbolic development (Piaget, 1951), one could assume that visual imagery
develops during the pre-school period, when children create increasingly
complex symbolic representations of the external world (Gärdenfors, 2003; for
empirical evidence, see Kosslyn et al., 1990).
Mental images have been
regarded as ‘internal triggers’ of emotions (e.g.,
Plutchik, 1984), and studies have
revealed that visual imagery associated with different emotions
involves different imagery contents (e.g., Lyman & Waters, 1989), as well
as different patterns of physiological response (Schwartz, Weinberger, & Singer, 1981). It has been suggested that musical stimuli are
especially effective in stimulating visual imagery (Osborne, 1980; Quittner
& Glueckauf, 1983) and a few studies have indicated that imagery can be
effective in enhancing emotions to music (Band, Quilter, & Miller,
2001-2002; see also Västfjäll, 2002, p. 183).
The precise nature of this
visual imagery process remains to be determined, but listeners seem to
conceptualize the musical structure through a metaphorical nonverbal mapping
between the music and so-called ‘image-schemata’ grounded in bodily experience
(Bonde, 2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980); for example, hearing melodic movement
as ‘upward’. We argue that listeners respond to mental images much in the same
way as they would to the corresponding stimuli in the ‘real’ world – for
example, reacting with positive emotions to a beautiful nature scene (see
Figure 2.4. in Bradley & Lang, 2007, for examples of affective responses to
various pictures).
Osborne (1989) reported
certain recurrent ‘themes’ in visual imagery to music, such as nature scenes
(e.g., sun, sky, ocean) and out-of-body experiences (e.g., floating above the
earth), but these results were probably affected by the particular musical
style used (“spacey, synthesized electronic music with simple structure, some
free form, and much repetition”, p. 134). Indeed, it has been suggested that
certain musical characteristics are especially effective in stimulating vivid
imagery, such as repetition, predictability in melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic
elements, and slow tempo (McKinney & Timms, 1995).
A special feature of the
imagery mechanism is that the listener is very much able to influence the
emotions induced by the music. Although images might come into the mind
unbidden, in general a listener may conjure-up, manipulate, and dismiss images
at will. Larson (1995) has speculated that music offers a medium for
adolescents, in particular, through which they may conjure-up strong emotional
images around which a temporary sense of self can cohere. The music is like a
‘fantasy ground’ for exploring possible selves during the important process of
resolving a personal identity in late adolescence (see also Becker, 2001;
DeNora, 2001).
Visual imagery in
relationship to music has been discussed most extensively in the context of
music therapy (Toomey, 1996-1997). Helen Bonny developed a method, Guided Imagery and Music (GIM), where a
‘traveler’ is invited to ‘share’ his or her images as they are experienced in
real time during a pre-programmed sequence of music (see Bonny & Savary,
1973). Music-induced imagery may produce a state of deep relaxation, with
health benefits such as reduced cortisol levels (McKinney, Antoni, Kumar, Tims,
& McCabe, 1997). However, there seem be large individual differences with
regard to the ability to generate visual images (Marks, 1973).
Visual imagery may occur
in connection with episodic memories (discussed below), although it seems
necessary to distinguish the two mechanisms, because a music experience may
evoke emotions when a listener conjures up images of things and events that
have never occurred, in the absence of any episodic memory from a previous
event in time. Moreover, visual imagery is more strongly influenced or shaped
by the unfolding structure of the music than is episodic memory, for which the
music mainly serves a retrieval cue. In the words of Meyer (1956), “it seems
probable that…image processes play a role of great importance in the musical
affective experiences of many listeners” (p. 258).
3.1.5. Episodic memory
Episodic memory refers to
a process whereby an emotion is induced in a listener because the music evokes
a memory of a particular event in the listener’s life. This is sometimes
referred to as the ‘Darling, they are playing our tune’ phenomenon (Davies,
1978).
Research has suggested
that music often evokes memories (e.g., Gabrielsson, 2001; Juslin et al., 2006;
Sloboda, 1992). When the memory is evoked, so is also the emotion associated
with the memory (e.g., Baumgartner, 1992). Such emotions can be rather intense,
perhaps because the physiological reaction patterns to the original events are
stored in memory along with the experiential content, as proposed by Lang
(1979). Baumgartner (1992) reported evidence that episodic memories evoked by
music tend to involve social relationships (e.g., past or current romantic
partners, time spent with friends).[11]
However, the memories can involve all kinds of events, such as vacations,
movies, music concerts, a victory in a boxing match, the death of a
grandfather, or childhood memories (Baumgartner, 1992; see
further examples in Gabrielsson, 2001, p. 439; Juslin et al., 2006). Indeed,
music accompanies most important human activities from the cradle to the grave
(Gregory, 1997), although due to childhood
amnesia listeners are unlikely to recall much from the first years of their
life (Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). Children’s ability to recall and converse
about episodic memories develops slowly across the pre-school years (e.g.,
Fivush & Sales, 2004; Perner & Ruffman, 1995), and episodic memory is
the type of memory that begins to decline first as a result of aging (e.g.,
Tulving, 2002). Both kinds of developmental trends should be observable in
listeners’ emotional reactions to music based on episodic memory.
Episodic memory is one of
the induction mechanisms that have commonly been regarded as less ‘musically
relevant’ by music theorists, but recent evidence suggests that it could be one
of the most frequent and subjectively important sources of emotion in music
(see Juslin et al., 2006; Sloboda & O’Neill, 2001). Many listeners actively
use music to remind them of valued past events, which indicates that music can
serve an important nostalgic function in everyday life. The music may help to
consolidate a listener’s self identity. Furthermore, a retrospective memory
study by Sloboda (1989) has indicated that strong and positively valenced
childhood memories of musical events may be important in determining which
individuals will pursue a high level of involvement in music later in life.
In previous research, most
researchers have regarded both conditioning and episodic memory as cases of
memory-based or ‘associative’ mechanisms (Dowling & Harwood, 1986; Scherer
& Zentner, 2001; Sloboda & Juslin, 2001). However, there are good
reasons to view these as partly separate and independent mechanisms. Although evaluative
conditioning is a form of memory, episodic memory is different in that it
always involves a conscious recollection of a previous event in time that
preserves much contextual information. Also, unlike conditioning, episodic
memory appears to be organized in terms of a hierarchical structure with three
levels: life-time periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge (see
Conway & Rubin, 1993). Furthermore, the two kinds of memory have partly
different process characteristics and brain substrates (Section 3.2). Hence,
they should be distinguished in research on musical emotions in order to not
yield inconsistent findings.
One important
characteristic of episodic memory, more generally, is the common finding that people
tend to recall more memories from their youth and early adulthood (15 to 25
years of age) than from those periods that precede or follow it. This is
referred to as the reminiscence bump,
and may be explained by the fact that many self-defining experiences tend to
occur at this stage of life development (Conway & Holmes, 2005, p. 513). In
this context, it should be noted that music seems to play a very prominent role
in adolescents’ lives and, particularly, in relation to the development of a self-identity
(Laiho, 2004). Hence, we would expect episodic memories associated with music
to be particularly emotionally vivid and frequent with regard to music from
young adulthood, as indeed seems to be the case. Schulkind, Hennis, and Rubin
(1999) found that older adults preferred, knew more about, as well as had
stronger emotional responses to music popular during their youth than to music
popular later in life. Further, both younger and older adults were more likely
to retrieve a spontaneous autobiographical memory when they were cued by a song
that moved them emotionally. Holbrook and Schindler (1989) also found that
participants showed the greatest liking for music that was popular during their
youth. Hence, one reasonable prediction could be that emotional reactions to
music involving episodic memory more commonly involve events from one’s youth
and early adulthood than from other periods in one’s life. Empirical evidence
suggests that nostalgia may be one of the more common responses to music
(Sloboda & O’Neill, 2001).
3.1.6. Musical
expectancy
Musical expectancy refers
to a process whereby an emotion is induced in a listener because a specific
feature of the music violates, delays, or confirms the listener’s expectations
about the continuation of the music. For instance, the sequential progression
of E-F# sets up the musical expectation that the music will continue with G#
(Sloboda, 1992). If this does not happen, the listener may become, for
instance, surprised.
This psychological
mechanism has been most extensively theorized by Meyer (1956), in what could
well be the most cited volume on music and emotion ever. Meyer’s theory was
inspired by Aiken’s (1950; cited in Meyer, 1956, p. 25) ideas regarding musical
expectations as well as by contemporary psychological theories of perception
(e.g., the ‘gestalt school’) and emotions (e.g., Dewey’s conflict theory of
emotions). However, Meyer was the first theorist to develop the notion of
musical expectancy in a convincing and thorough manner. It must be noted that
musical expectancy does not refer to any
unexpected event that might occur in relationship to music. A simple form of
unexpectedness (e.g., the sudden onset of a loud tone) would instead be an
example of the mechanism called brain stem reflex (see Section 3.1.1).
Similarly, more general surprising features of an event that involves music
(e.g., that a concert was better than the listener had expected) would instead
be an example of the mechanism cognitive appraisal. Musical expectancy refers
to those expectancies that involve syntactical
relationships between different parts
of the musical structure (Narmour, 1991; Patel, 2003).
Like language, music
consists of perceptually discrete elements, organized into hierarchically
structured sequences according to ‘well-formedness’ rules. Thus, it is a common
view among music theorists that most musical styles are, in principle,
describable by a grammar (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983). It is only through
the perception of this syntax that the relevant musical expectations arise.
These expectations are based on the listener’s previous experiences of the same
musical style (Carlsen, 1981; Krumhansl et al., 1999). Emotional reactions to
music are induced when the listener’s musical expectations are somehow
disrupted, for instance by new or unprepared harmony (for examples, see
Steinbeis et al., 2006).
The musical expectancy mechanism
is notable for its strong dependence on learning (Meyer, 1956). Evidence that
musical expectancies depend much on cultural learning comes from the fact that
such responses are not shared by young children. For instance, Sloboda (1989)
found that five-year old children were unable to reject gross chordal
dissonances as ‘wrong’. By the age of nine, however, they were overtly laughing
at the ‘wrong’ chords and scoring at an adult level. Another test in the same
study focused on the ordering of the chords that could be either conventional
(ending with a cadence) or ‘scrambled’ (ending without resolution). On this
test, children did not achieve adult levels of performance until the age of
eleven. Evidence of age differences have also been reported with regard to
sensitivity to tonal hierarchies (Krumhansl & Keil, 1982) and implied
harmony (Trainor & Trehub, 1994). Although the ability to detect
syntactical violations can be observed early (Jentschke et al., 2005),
responses due to musical expectancies also depend on sufficient exposure to the
musical style in question.
Meyer discussed emotions
in an approach characteristic for his time (i.e., as undifferentiated arousal;
see Duffy, 1941), but he observed that mere arousal through interruption of
musical expectancies has little value. To have any ‘aesthetic meaning’, the
arousal or tension must be followed by a satisfying resolution of the tension. In fact, Meyer (1956) appeared open
to the possibility that this musical play with expectations may lead to the
induction of more specific emotions, such as apprehension/anxiety (p. 27), hope
(p. 29), or disappointment (p. 182), but these ideas have still not been
tested. In fact, while highly influential and respected, Meyer’s theory has not
stimulated much research (but see Sloboda, 1991), perhaps because the theory is
difficult to test. For example, a piece of music could produce several
different expectations at different hierarchical levels of the music, and these
expectations could also be different for different listeners. Therefore, it is
difficult to understand or predict exactly what the listener is responding to
in a particular situation.
In recent years, however, researchers have
developed novel models of expectancy (Hellmuth Margulis, 2005; see also Huron,
2006), which should make it more feasible to test predictions experimentally.
Neurophysiological methods might be useful in this regard. It has been found
that violations of musical expectancy activate the same brain areas that have
been previously implicated in violations of syntax in language (Koelsch et al.,
2002; Maess et al., 2001). Patel (2003) has therefore suggested that
syntactical processing in both language and music share a common set of
processes for syntactical integration (localized in Broca’s area) that operate
on distinct structural representations for music and language. Evidence
that expectancy violations can induce emotions was recently reported by
Steinbeis et al. (2006).
Thus, it seems likely that some of our
emotions to music reflect the disruption of style-specific expectations.
3.2. How can the mechanisms be distinguished?
How may we describe the
relationships among the different mechanisms? We propose that it could be
useful to think of the mechanisms as consisting of a number of (more or less)
distinct brain functions that have
developed gradually and in a specific order during the evolutionary process,
from sensations (brain stem reflexes) to syntactical processing (musical
expectancy) (Gärdenfors, 2003). We
regard the mechanisms as information-processing devices at various levels of
the brain that use various means to track significant aspects of the
environment, and that may produce conflicting outputs (Griffiths, 2004; Teasdale, 1999).[12]
They all take music as their ‘object’, treating the music – rightly or wrongly
– as featuring significant information that warrants an emotional response.
However, note that the emotion induced is not the result of an appraisal of the music on several dimensions
relative to the listener’s motives, needs, or goals. Because the mechanisms
depend on distinct brain functions with different evolutionary origins, each
mechanism should possess unique characteristics. Hence, Table 4 presents a set
of preliminary hypotheses regarding the characteristics of each mechanism. The mechanisms are listed in the approximate
order in which they can be hypothesized to have appeared during evolution
(Gärdenfors, 2003; see also Joseph, 2000; Reber, 1993; Tulving, 1983).[13]
The hypotheses can be
divided into two subgroups: the first subgroup concerns characteristics of the
psychological mechanism as such. Thus, Survival value of brain function describes the most important benefit that
each brain function brought to those organisms that possessed this brain
function.[14]
Visual imagery, for
example, allowed an organism to ‘simulate’ important
events internally, through self-conjured images in the absence of direct
sensory input, which meant that overt and potentially dangerous action plans
could be tested and evaluated before they were implemented in the external
world. Information focus
specifies broadly the type of information that each mechanism is processing.
For instance, evaluative conditioning focuses on covariation between events. Ontogenetic
development concerns the
approximate time in human development when respective mechanism might begin to
have a noticeable effect on emotional responses to music. Brain stem reflexes
to music could be functional even prior to birth, whereas responses involving
musical expectancy do not develop fully until somewhere between the ages of 5
and 11. Key brain regions
describes those regions of the brain that have been most consistently
associated with each mechanism in imaging studies. Note that musical
emotions can be expected to involve three kinds of brain regions: (1) regions
usually involved when music is perceived, such as the primary auditory cortex;
(2) regions usually involved in the conscious experience of emotions regardless
of the precise cause of the emotions (e.g., the rostral anterior cingulate and
the medial prefrontal cortex; e.g., Lane, 2000, pp. 356-358), and (3) regions
involved in emotional information-processing that (partly) differ depending on the mechanism
inducing the emotion. Hence, while musical emotions are likely to involve
several brain regions (Peretz, 2001), the hypotheses in Table 4 focus on the
last type of regions (those that can help researchers to discriminate
among mechanisms). For instance, the experience of conscious recollection of an
episodic memory is associated with activation of the brain region hippocampus. Cultural
impact/learning refers to the
relative extent to which each mechanism is influenced differently by music that
varies from one culture to another. For example, brain stem reflexes reflect
primarily ‘hard-wired’ responses to simple features that are not affected much
by learning, whereas musical expectancy reflects learned schemata about
specific styles of music that differ from one culture to another and that make
listeners from different cultures react differently to the same piece of music.
A second subgroup of
characteristics (see Table 4) concerns the precise nature of the emotion
induction process associated with each mechanism. Induced affect specifies which affective states might be expected
to be induced, depending on the mechanism. For example, whereas emotional
contagion might be expected to induce only ‘basic’ emotions, which have more or
less distinct nonverbal expressions of emotion, visual imagery might be
expected to induce all possible human emotions. Induction speed refers to how much time each mechanism requires, in
relation to other mechanisms, for an emotion to occur in a particular
situation. For example, brain stem reflexes can induce emotions very quickly
(in less than a second), whereas musical expectancy can be expected to require
more time (at least a number of seconds) because some of the musical structure
has to unfold in order for any musical expectation to occur that can be
confirmed or violated. Degree of
volitional influence refers to the extent to which the listener him- or
herself could actively influence the induction process (e.g., through focus of
attention, active recall, self-activation). For instance, reactions that
involve evaluative conditioning may be involuntary and automatic, whereas
reactions that involve visual imagery may be strongly influenced by the way the
listener actively chooses to entertain some inner images and themes rather than
others. Availability to consciousness
is the extent to which at least some
aspects of the induction process are available to the listener’s consciousness,
so that the listener may be able to explain his or her response. For example,
if a piece of music evokes a strong episodic memory, the listener will have a
conscious recollection of a previous event and some inkling of the reasons
(e.g., the appraisal) that made this event evoke the same emotion that is now
re-experienced. Conversely, evaluative conditioning responses to music can be
both learned and aroused outside conscious awareness. Therefore, a listener
that experiences a musical emotion via this mechanism could be completely
unable to explain any aspect of the induction process. Modularity refers to the extent to which the induction process of
each mechanism functions as an independent and information-encapsulated module
that may be activated in parallel with other psychological processes.[15] For
instance, emotional contagion can be described as highly modular, because it
may be activated independently of other processes, and is not influenced by the
information of other modules (e.g., we respond to the expressive
characteristics of the music as if
they came from a human being expressing emotions in the voice even if we know,
at some cognitive level, that the music is not a voice). Dependence on musical structure refers to the extent to which the induction depends
on the precise structure or style of the music that the listener is hearing. At
one extreme, the structure of the music is not important as such – it simply
functions as a ‘retrieval cue’. This is the case for evaluative conditioning
and episodic memory. At the other extreme, the precise pattern of the musical
structure strongly determines the nature of the induced response. This is the
case for musical expectancy.
Empirical findings of
relevance to the hypotheses shown in Table 4 could come from a broad range of
research domains such as memory, development, emotional expression,
evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, learning, clinical psychology and
psychophysiology, as well as music psychology and music therapy. A selected
number of representative sources that render theoretical or empirical support
to each hypothesis have been included in Table 4. As much as possible, we have
tried to include sources that involve music, although most sources focus on the
mechanism more generally, as explored in fields other than music. Hence,
further research is needed to test most of the hypotheses in regard to music.
We acknowledge that some of the hypotheses are imprecise and mainly descriptive.
This reflects the current lack of research on these issues. However, we argue
that even simple predictions in terms of ‘high’ and ‘low’ can be tested in
experiments that contrast one mechanism against another. Such tests could
help to render the hypotheses more specific.
We propose that the
testing of the new framework could involve an approach consisting of an
interplay between field studies (diary studies, questionnaires) and
experimental studies. Field studies that allow researchers to study listeners’
emotional reactions to music in their natural environment could generate
hypotheses about possible causal factors and relationships. These factors and
relationships could then be formalized in a preliminary model, which is
evaluated in experiments. These experiments may suggest the need for further
knowledge about specific factors, wherefore further field studies may be
needed. By combining the approaches we may eventually arrive at general
principles that can form the basis of a more detailed model of the induction
process, featuring a description of the time-course and the inter-relationships
of the different mechanisms. Field studies are required, because if there are
several mechanisms that can induce musical emotions, and their importance
varies depending on the situation, only by sampling a wide variety of
situations can we hope to capture all the mechanisms. On the other hand,
certain mechanisms, such as conditioning, may be difficult to demonstrate other
than in a controlled laboratory setting. Field studies will have to focus on
self-reports – although with the possible addition of ambulatory physiological
measures (see Fahrenberg & Myrtek, 1996). Laboratory studies may involve
any combination of the measures shown in Table 2, as well as indirect measures
(Table 3), to maximize the validity of conclusions about induced emotions.
4. Implications
4.1. Resolving previous disagreements
One implication of the
new framework is that it can resolve many disagreements in the field. Specifically,
apparent contradictions of different approaches may be reconciled by observing
that they focus on different psychological mechanisms. For example, one
recurring theme in studies of music and emotion concerns the role of the person
experiencing the emotion in the causal process. At one extreme is the case
where the emotion is induced ‘automatically’ and ‘involuntarily’ (e.g., Peretz,
2001); at the other extreme is the case where the person uses the music as a
resource in a more active process of emotion construction (see DeNora, 2001;
see also Meyer, 1956, p. 11). These different views can be reconciled by
observing that different mechanisms may be involved in each case: for instance,
emotion induction through evaluative conditioning may really be direct and
involuntary, whereas emotion induction through visual imagery may require
active engagement of the listener. Only consideration of the mechanism involved
can resolve this kind of argument.
The framework can also
help to explain some previous disagreements about which emotions music can
induce in a listener. Some researchers argue that music can induce basic
emotions (Krumhansl, 1997), while others deny that this is possible (Scherer,
2003). Some researchers argue that music can induce only ‘broad’ positive and
negative emotions (Clark, 1983), while others
argue that music can induce a range of both basic and complex emotions
(Gabrielsson, 2001). However, as shown in Table 4, which emotions music can
induce could depend on the precise mechanism involved. For example, emotional
contagion may be limited to more basic emotions, whereas visual imagery may
induce all possible emotions. Hence, although certain emotions (e.g.,
happiness, calm, sadness, contentment, nostalgia) may be especially common with
regard to music (Juslin et al., 2006), we should be careful not to rule out the
induction of other emotions. Which emotions music can induce depends on the functions of the music in a particular
situation (e.g., using music ‘to relax’, ‘to evoke nostalgic memories’, etc.),
and may thus vary considerably from one context to another. This implies that
researchers should avoid settling prematurely on a particular conceptualization
of emotions (e.g., discrete, dimensional, component, or music-specific) before
more data regarding the frequency of different emotions to music in everyday
life have been collected.[16]
4.2. Musical emotions vs. other emotions
A recurrent issue in
research on musical emotions is whether musical emotions are somehow
qualitatively different from other emotions in everyday life. Swanwick (1985),
for example, suggests that “emotions in ‘life’… and
emotions we might experience as a result of engaging with music are not the
same” (p. 29) (although he admits that “we are left trying to understand how
‘feelings’ in music relate to feelings in general”, p. 35). Similarly, Lippman
(1953) warns researchers not to “fall into the easy trap...of assuming that
because musical and extra-musical events both evoke emotions, they must evoke
the same emotions…It is no more possible for a musical composition actually to
arouse an instance of…sadness than it is for the stimulus of such an emotion to
arouse the very emotion produced by a musical composition” (p. 563).
In contrast, the
present framework implies that music recruits largely the same mechanisms as
other stimuli that induce emotions and that the emotions evoked by music are
the same. Some emotions may be more common than others in response to music,
but the same is true of most other types of stimuli for emotions. For instance,
some emotions might be more common than others in response to animals. Some
emotions might be more common than others in response to sport events. Still,
we would not propose a set of qualitatively unique emotions for each of these
types of events. The burden of proof lies, in our view, on those who claim that
there are music-specific emotions. Which are those emotions? What is their
nature? So far we have not seen any evidence for the existence of
music-specific emotions. A more parsimonious view is that there is one set of
emotions that can be evoked in different ways and to different degrees by
different stimuli. This view is consistent with findings from several studies
suggesting that music evokes mostly the same emotions as other stimuli
(Gabrielsson, 2001; Juslin & Laukka, 2004; Sloboda, 1992; Wells &
Hakanen, 1991). What is unique about musical emotions is not the underlying
mechanisms or the emotions they evoke, but rather the fact that music – unlike
most other stimuli for our emotions in everyday life – is often intentionally
designed to induce emotions, using whatever means available (see Davies, 2001,
for a similar argument).
4.3. Relationships among mechanisms
Another implication of
the framework is that music could induce so-called ‘mixed emotions’, because
different mechanisms might be activated simultaneously at different levels.
Thus, for example, a piece of music could make the listener happy because of
the happy expression of the piece (emotional contagion), but at the same time
make the listener sad because the piece reminds him or her of a sad event in
the past (episodic memory). Thus, the end result may be a bitter-sweet feeling
of both happiness and sadness. Instances of mixed emotions have been commonly
reported in the literature (e.g., Gabrielsson, 2001, p. 440), but no
explanation has been offered previously. The current explanation requires that
more than one mechanism can be activated at the same time – which remains to be
demonstrated. However, this issue is not unique for musical emotions: it
remains unclear to what extent emotions can generally reflect the output from
many mechanisms simultaneously (Izard, 1993). In any case, the existence of
mixed emotions speaks against using the ‘circumplex model’ (Russell, 1980) to
study musical emotions, since it precludes feeling both sad and happy at the
same time (Larsen et al., 2001).
The possible
co-activation of different psychological mechanisms – at least those that do
not interfere with each other’s information processing – suggests that an
important task for future research is to examine possible interactions between different mechanisms. The mechanisms proposed
here may seem simple: How can the extremely diverse music experiences reported
by listeners in previous studies be reconciled with the simple theories
proposed to account for these experiences? Part of the answer may be that the
richness of our experiences comes from the complex interactions among these mechanisms, even within a single musical
event. What mechanisms may be activated depends on several factors in the music
(e.g., what information is available in the music?), the listener (e.g., is the
listener’s attention focused on the music?), and the situation (e.g., what are
the circumstances of the listening context?). Thus, individual mechanisms may
be expected to correlate with specific musical styles, listener states,
listener activities, and listening situations (Juslin et al., 2006). We see no
apriori reason to assume that the mechanisms cannot be activated in isolation
from each other, since they focus on different types of information and engage
partly different brain regions (see Table 4). However, this is an empirical
question to be resolved by further research.
One further implication
is that emotions to music should change qualitatively across the life span, as
the relative impact of the different
psychological mechanisms changes. Preliminary evidence that there is a
developmental trajectory for emotional responses to music have been reported
(Schmidt, Trainor, & Santesso, 2003; Sloboda, 1989), but more systematic
study of such life-span changes seems warranted (see Table 4, Ontogenetic
development). We would expect that emotional reactions to music proceed in a
more or less orderly progression during the development, where listeners’
reactions first focus on acoustic sensations (i.e., brain stem reflexes), then
on the emotional expression in the music (i.e., emotional contagion), and then
on more stylistic or formal characteristics of the music (i.e., musical
expectancy). It should be noted that Swanwick and Tillman’s model of musical
skill development proposes a somewhat similar developmental trajectory
(Swanwick, 2001). In both cases, the trajectory might reflect a gradual maturation
of the child’s cognitive functioning as well as cultural learning. Thus, we
would expect musical emotions to become increasingly multi-faceted during the
development, with increasing occurrence of mixed emotions (see also Larsen et
al., in press).
4.4. The cost of neglecting mechanisms
The most important
implication of the proposed framework for future research in the field is that
it will not be sufficient to induce and study musical emotions in general. In order for data to contribute
in a cumulative fashion to our knowledge, researchers must try to specify as
far as possible the mechanism involved in each study. Otherwise studies will
produce results that are inconsistent, or that cannot be given a clear
interpretation. Lack of control with respect to mechanisms may also increase
individual differences in listeners’ responses, because without a systematic
manipulation of stimuli, different listeners may activate different mechanisms
to the ‘same’ musical stimulus, with resulting differences in response (Table
4). While a neglect of mechanisms has been the rule rather than the exception,
there are areas where this problem becomes particularly salient. A case in
point is provided by the recent series of brain imaging studies of musical
emotions. Numerous brain regions have been implicated in these studies –
including but not limited to thalamus, cerebellum, hippocampus, amygdala,
cingulate cortex, orbito-frontal cortex, midbrain/PAG, insula, Broca’s area,
nucleus accumbens, visual cortex, and supplementary motor areas (Bauer
Alfredson et al., 2004; Blood & Zatorre, 2001; Blood et al., 1999; Brown et
al., 2004; Gosselin et al., 2006; Koelsch et al., 2006; Menon & Levitin,
2005). However, different brain regions have been activated in different
studies, without any clear explanation of why these differences should occur.
We would argue that the
main problem is that that neuropsychological studies have tended to simply
present ‘emotional music’ to listeners without manipulating, or at least
controlling for, the underlying induction mechanism.[17] This
makes it exceedingly difficult to understand what the obtained neural
correlates actually reflect in each study (“It is not possible to disentangle
the different subcomponents of the activation due to limitations of this
experimental design”, Bauer Afredson et al., 2004, p. 165). Given the aim of
studying emotional reactions to music, one would expect the manipulation of
musical stimuli to be essential to the task. Yet, stimuli have been selected
non-systematically (e.g., instrumental songs of the rembetika style, joyful
dance tunes, listener-selected music). The fact that different studies have
reported activations of different brain regions does suggest that different
mechanisms were involved. But after the fact, there is no way of knowing. This
shows that musical emotions cannot be studied without regard to how they were
induced. On the other hand, if researchers could manipulate separate induction
mechanisms in future listening experiments, they would be better able to
explain the obtained brain activation patterns. Indeed, to the extent that we
can obtain systematic relations among mechanisms and brain regions, we might
eventually be able to discriminate among the mechanisms based on
brain measures alone. However, no study published so far has quite the
specificity needed to contribute to that goal.
4.5. Implications for emotion research
It is possible that
the present framework could have some broader implications as well. Thus, for instance,
the study of musical induction of emotions along the lines suggested here could
benefit the field of emotion as a whole. A serious problem in studying emotions
has been the methodological and ethical difficulties involved in inducing
strong emotions in the laboratory. Many studies in the field of emotion either
lack experimental control (when using naturalistic settings) or achieve only a
limited variation in target emotions and limited ecological validity (when
using laboratory settings; see Parrott & Hertel, 1999). Music could evade
some of these problems by offering new paradigms for emotion induction,
especially with regard to positive emotions, which have tended to be neglected
in previous research. Musical structure is easy to manipulate in psychological
experiments and is a frequent source of emotion in everyday life. Thus, studies
of music could provide an additional source of evidence concerning emotions.
The unique
characteristics of the various induction mechanisms (see Table 4) will be crucial
when researchers design experiments that aim to induce a specific emotion.
Specifically, it is important that the study involves an induction procedure
that allows for the induction of that
emotion. Some procedures may limit the kind of emotions that can be induced
depending on the mechanism involved (e.g., Table 4, Induced affect). Some
mechanisms require particular acoustic characteristics in the stimulus (e.g.,
emotional contagion), others require a prolonged encoding phase (e.g.,
conditioning), still others require sufficient listening time in order for a
sufficient amount of structure to unfold (e.g., musical expectancy). Thus, to
facilitate studies of musical emotions, we should try to create standard
paradigms and tasks that reliably induce specific emotions in listeners through
each of the mechanisms outlined above. This would be analogous to the different
tasks used to measure distinct memory systems (see Tulving, 1983). A more
systematic and theoretically informed approach to the manipulation of musical
stimuli would be a significant advance compared to the mostly intuitive
selection of stimuli in current studies using music as an emotion elicitation
technique (Eich et al., 2007; Västfjäll, 2002).
Possible stimuli and
procedures for inducing different kinds of musical emotions can already be
found in the literature, although they need further evaluation and refinement.
For instance, paradigms aimed at activating brain
stem reflexes could rely on psycho-acoustic models that specify quantitative
relationships between sound stimuli and auditory perception (Zwicker &
Fastl, 1999). Paradigms aimed at activating the evaluative conditioning mechanism could use established procedures
from studies of conditioning (Lavond & Steinmetz, 2003). Paradigms aimed at
activating the emotional contagion
mechanism could create stimuli based on similar emotion-specific patterns of
acoustic cues in speech and music (Juslin & Laukka, 2003, Table 7), perhaps
also using timbres that are ‘voice-like’, such as the cello and the violin.
Paradigms aimed at activating the visual
imagery mechanism could rely on extensive programs of music developed
especially for the purpose of stimulating imagery to music in therapy (Bruscia
& Grocke, 2002, e.g., Appendices B-L). Paradigms aimed at activating the musical expectancy mechanism could rely
on both stimuli and procedures that have already been used to explore
syntactical processing in music perception (Koelsch et al., 2000). Perhaps, the
most difficult mechanism for musical emotion induction to activate in a
controlled way in the laboratory is episodic
memory, because the laboratory situation is not conducive to establishing
the strong personal significance needed to encode an emotional episodic memory.
To fully explore the
mechanisms and test the hypotheses in Table 4, we need not only be able to
activate each mechanism. To separate the effects of different mechanisms, we
must also be able to suppress or eliminate particular mechanisms in individual
cases. Although space
does not permit a detailed exposition of experimental set-ups in this target
article, we propose that this
could be done in two principal ways. Firstly, one could manipulate stimuli in such a way as to withhold or
eliminate information required for a specific mechanism to be activated (the principle of information impoverishment).
Musical structures are easy to manipulate and there are sophisticated
techniques in acoustics that allow researchers to standardize a stimulus with
regard to certain acoustic features, while leaving others intact. Secondly, one could design the procedure in
such a manner that it will prevent the type of information processing required
for a particular mechanism to be activated (the
principle of interference). This could be done in a number of ways. One
approach could be to force listeners to allocate the ‘cognitive resources’
needed for a specific mechanism to a task instead; for instance, one could use
an experimental task that recruits attentional resources to such an extent that
visual imagery, also dependent on these resources, will be made impossible.
Another possibility could be to use a neurochemical interference strategy; for example, it has been shown that
blocking of a specific class of amino acid receptors (NMDA) in the lateral amygdala
can interfere with the acquisition of evaluative conditioning (e.g.,
Miserendino et al., 1990). Yet another form of interference involves the use of transcranial magnetic stimulation
(Pascual-Leone et al., 2002). By disrupting brain activity at crucial times and
locations, one may prevent specific mechanisms from becoming activated by a
musical stimulus.
Another implication
concerns the role of cognitive appraisal relative to other mechanisms. A common
characteristic of human behavior is that it is multiply determined (Brunswik,
1956). This is true also for emotions, although the possibility of multiple
induction mechanisms that interact has been somewhat neglected in previous
research (but see Izard, 1993). It is usually assumed that appraisals account
for the lion’s share of emotions in everyday life, but there is little formal
evidence so far to support this notion – primarily because it is difficult to
test the notion using the type of ‘post-hoc’ self-reports of emotions that have
dominated in studies of cognitive appraisal to date (Frijda & Zeelenberg,
2001). A crucial question is to what degree the additional mechanisms described
here play a role in non-musical emotional episodes. The present framework
implies that there is no simple ‘one-to-one’ relationship between cognitive
appraisals and emotions. Instead, there are several mechanisms that –
singularly or together – determine emotional outcomes, according to the precise
conditions of the situation. Ellsworth (1994) acknowledges that musical emotions
pose “a real threat to the generality of appraisals as elicitors of emotion”
(p. 195). To the extent that a great deal of our emotional responses in
everyday life involve mechanisms such as conditioning, contagion, and episodic
memory, an approach similar to that advocated in this target article could be
fruitful also in understanding non-musical emotions. Does this mean that what we
claim about music, that emotions cannot be studied without regard to how they
were evoked, is true of non-musical emotions as well? To the extent that the
received view is correct, namely that non-musical emotions are mostly induced
through cognitive appraisal (Ellsworth, 1994; Scherer, 1999), the issue of
controlling for the underlying mechanism may not be as important outside the
musical domain. However, this is an empirical question that awaits further
research.
5. Concluding Remarks
It could
appear that our claim that musical emotions must be investigated with regard to
their underlying mechanisms is uncontroversial, and that all music
psychologists would agree. Yet this is not how research has been conducted,
which is ultimately what counts. Studies thus far have produced data that are
collectively confusing and internally inconsistent, mainly because researchers
have been considering only the induced emotions themselves, instead of trying
to manipulate the underlying mechanisms in a systematic manner. We argue that much progress may be achieved,
provided that more rigorous theoretical and methodological approaches are
adopted. Considering the crucial implications that such an endeavor could have
for both basic and applied research in music psychology and psychology in
general, this opportunity should not be missed. For instance, it has been
increasingly recognized that music may have positive effects on physical health
and subjective well-being (e.g., Khalfa et al., 2003; Pelletier, 2004). We
suggest that many of these effects are mediated by the emotions that the music
induces. A better understanding of the mechanisms underlying these emotions
could therefore be of great importance for applications, such as music therapy.
Meyer (1956), one of the
pioneers in this field, argued that “given no theory as to the relation of
musical stimuli to affective responses, observed behavior can provide little
information as to either the nature of the stimulus, the significance of the
response, or the relation between them” (p. 10). In other words, amassing data
on listeners’ emotional reactions to music is not fruitful, unless one is able
to interpret these data in the light
of an explanatory theory. In this target article, we have proposed a
theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses that may aid researchers in
exploring the manifold and different mechanisms that relate music to emotions –
all musical emotions are not created equal.[18]
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