Commentary on Michael A. Arbib
Word Counts:
Abstract: 60 words
Main Text: 753 words
References: 126 words
Total Text: 939 words
Abstract: The Mirror System Hypothesis provides a good framework for the emergence of language in evolution. However, this approach neglects the problem of meaning, which is deeply rooted in social norms and cannot be accounted for by the descriptive vocabulary of the natural sciences. We propose that the Mirror System Hypothesis should be complemented by a social (“externalistic”) account of semantics.
Beyond innateness and modularityArbib presents a well-founded alternative to Chomsky´s approach to linguistics. He avoids several presuppositions of Chomsky´s theory like innateness, autonomy of syntax, and species-specifity of the language faculty which several researchers in the field of linguistics think of as empirically unfounded (e.g. Mueller, 1996). On the other hand, the present paper follows a Chomskyan tradition as the problem of meaning is only touched upon marginally (e.g. p. 41-42). We think that Arbib should be more explicit with regard to meaning issues. In our view the Mirror System Hypothesis is in good agreement with an externalistic account of semantics.
ExternalismExternalists deny that there is any fact about my mental states or my brain tissue that constitutes the meaning of my words (Kripke, 1982; Wittgenstein, 1958). All attempts to look into my mind/brain cannot determine what I meant by e.g. “addition” or – to use Quine´s example – what I meant by “gavagai” (Kripke, 1982; Quine, 1960). Meaning and – in general – language use depends crucially on public criteria and cannot be accounted for by individual facts of the matter or individual facts of the mind. Thus, language is intrinsically social (Davidson, 1990) and deeply relies on social norms. Therefore, semantic facts are facts which cannot be determined by empirical means (Kober, 1998). Or, as Wittgenstein put it: “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we are speaking of” (Wittgenstein, 1958). Wittgenstein´s (1958) and Kripke´s (1982) reasoning can be summarized as follows: Empirical sciences are descriptive (axiom 1); descriptive disciplines cannot explain or justify normative issues (axiom 2); speaking a language or successful communication depends on normative issues (axiom 3). Therefore, empirical sciences cannot explain or justify speaking a language or successful communication. Or, more generally, semantic truths are not empirical truths (Kober, 1998).
To avoid two possible problems: 1.) we certainly do not deny a biological or neurophysiological basis of language processing in the brain. There is abundant empirical evidence for several brain structures involved in language parsing (see e.g. Brown & Hagoort, 1999). What we deny is that language parsing constitutes meaning as localized in the individual brain. 2.) The proposed dualism of descriptive and normative vocabularies does not implicate mind-body dualism but is fully compatible with e.g. Davidson´s anomalous monism (Davidson, 1980).
InternalismInternalism, on the other hand, is thought of as the doctrine wherein features of the world are considered to be internal in current biological cognizers and where this internal presence is considered relevant to explaining cognition in general. In the internalist´s view a system is cognitive qua intentional, it has intentionality qua semanticity, and semanticity qua representation, and cognition is computation over (symbolic) representations (Kurthen, 1992). However, internalism seems to be the wrong credo because it is largely a means of creating a world model rich enough to let us “throw the world away”, allowing reason and thought to be focused upon the inner model instead (Clark, 1999). Internalism leads to a misconstruction of cognition as a whole, taking inner representations as an explanans rather than explanandum within that theory (Kurthen, 2001).
Semantics and the Mirror System HypothesisGoing back to Arbib there are many passages which can be read in favour of an externalistic approach to meaning. On page 9 of his paper Arbib points out that imitation learning is crucial to protolanguage. In the same vein, Wittgenstein argues that children start language learning by imitating utterances of adults (Wittgenstein, 1958) which in the long run results in the sharing of meaning (p. 11 of the present paper). In another passage, Arbib refers to the arbitrariness of symbols which is fixed by social conventions (“agreed upon by the community”, p. 32). These conventional symbols are thought of as a shortcut for “original pantomime” (p. 32) and have to be repeated often enough “to replace an elaborate pantomime with a conventionalized utterance of protosign or protospeech” (p. 43). In summary, these remarks are in good agreement with a social account of meaning. On the other hand, Arbib seems to have some sympathy for internalism as he refers to several fMRI- and PET studies (p. 48 ff. of the present paper) to support the Mirror System Hypothesis. These arguments are misleading as meanings cannot be located in the head. Altogether, Arbib oscillates between a compelling evolutionary approach of social language learning and internalistic arguments stemming from neuroimaging techniques. In our view, the alternative rather consists in either an incomplete linguistic theory (neglecting semantics) or in a combined approach of social sciences (normative aspect) and natural sciences (descriptive aspect) in order to encompass semantic phenomena as well.
References
Brown, C. M., & Hagoort, P. (Eds.). (1999). The Neurocognition of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (1999). An embodied cognitive science? Trends in Cognitive Science, 3, 345-51.
Davidson, D. (1980). Mental events. In D. Davidson (Ed.), Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. (1990). The structure and content of truth. Journal of Philosophy, 87, 279-328.
Kober, M. (1998). Kripkenstein meets the Chinese Room: Looking for a place of meaning from a natural point of view. Inquiry, 41, 317-332.
Kripke, S. A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Kurthen, M. (1992). Neurosemantik. Grundlagen einer Praxiologischen Kognitiven Neurowissenschaft. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke.
Kurthen, M. (2001). The archeology of internalism. Commentary to: Shepard, R. N.: Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 682-683.
Mueller, R.-A. (1996). Innateness, autonomy, universality? Neurobiological approaches to language. Behavioral and brain sciences, 19(4), 611-675.
Quine, W. v. O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.